As of November 2024, two well-established armed opposition groups remain active against the Taliban de facto authorities in Afghanistan. The National Resistance Front (NRF) and the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) both emerged within the first year after Taliban takeover, with NRF announcing themselves days after the fall of Kabul on 15 August 2021, and AFF some months later, in March 2022.

Initially, NRF focused on more traditional insurgent tactics by attempting to conquer and hold territory, in particular in the Panjshir Valley. After losing its ground there in 2022, the group appears to have slowly switched to a more modern form of urban guerrilla warfare. On the other hand, the AFF has adopted the latter strategy since its inception. 

Despite this clear change of tactics by the NRF, both groups still announced the start of their “fighting seasons” until as recently as 2023. In practice, however, this period - traditionally lasting from spring through autumn, before the cold Afghan winter leads to a lull in violence - has largely lost its meaning, as the groups increasingly focused on urban areas where cold weather is less of an impediment to attacks. Perhaps to reflect this, neither group announced the start of “fighting season” in 2024. In this analysis, AW assesses activities by both groups between January and October of this year.

Analysis of the number of attacks by AFF and NRF

AW analysed all claimed attacks announced by AFF and NRF social media accounts. Between 1 January and 31 October 2024, they claimed a combined total of 294 attacks against Taliban targets across 17 provinces. The NRF claimed the majority of these attacks (222, or some 75.5%), while AFF claims 72 attacks (24.5%).

Figure 1 below shows the number of claimed attacks during the first ten months of the year. The clear drop in AFF operations in March can be explained by the group’s announcement of a “suspension of military activity during the holy month of Ramadan” through a statement on 11 March 2024.

While the number of AFF attacks remained somewhat stable throughout the rest of the year, NRF operations have increased sharply since March. That could indicate that, despite the change in tactics to more guerrilla-style warfare, the group still operates on a somewhat seasonal pattern.

AW also assessed how the groups substantiated their claims, as armed groups in Afghanistan have been accused of falsely claiming attacks in the past. In total, the groups provided a combined 93 pieces of evidence to support their claims, mostly in the form of video recordings of alleged attacks against Taliban targets. There is, however, a clear difference between the groups when it comes to releasing evidence. While NRF only provided videos of 21.6% of their operations to support claims, AFF numbers were much higher at 62.5% (see Figure 2 below).

The reasons for this striking discrepancy are not immediately clear. AW, however, believes it is possibly due to NRF having a more well-established status - including through its high-profile leader, Ahmad Massoud - and therefore feels its reputation alone is enough to substantiate claims. AFF, on the other hand, is a newly formed group, whose leader General Yasin Zia is well-known among Afghans but has less of an international profile. Therefore, there may be more pressure on its members to use recordings to prove their claims. 

AW also noted that AFF’s announcements on their main social media account were always in Farsi and Pashto, seemingly targeting an Afghan audience. The group uses a separate account for their communications in English. Conversely, NRF shared their claims in Farsi and English using their main account, and a separate one when publishing their evidence. Both groups appear to be engaging international audiences, although using different communications tactics and emphasis. 

In terms of the geographic scope of AFF and NRF operations, AW found a notable increase in the number of provinces with claimed attacks from the first five months of the year (January to May 2024) to the following five months (June to October 2024).

Figure 3 below shows provinces where attacks had been claimed by only NRF (burgundy), only AFF (green), or both groups (black). The map on the left shows attacks claimed between January and May 2024 and on the right between June to October. Both groups appeared to maintain a strong operational presence in several central provinces north of Kabul throughout the year. Additionally, NRF claimed attacks in several northeastern and western provinces, increasing their total reach from ten to 14 provinces. AFF seemingly focused on expanding their operations in northern regions, increasing their reach from six to eight provinces.

In total, during the first ten months of the year, half (17) of all Afghan provinces saw claimed anti-Taliban attacks spearheaded by either NRF or AFF.

Despite operating across a broad geographic scope, both groups remain heavily focused on Kabul. The province accounted for 68% of all AFF claimed attacks and 40.5% of NRF attacks. However, while AFF only targeted Kabul city, NRF expanded some of their operations to the outskirts of the capital in the second half of 2024.

AW recorded a total of 135 claimed attacks by AFF and NRF across 16 Police Districts (PDs) in Kabul between January and October 2024. Most of the areas were covered by both armed resistance groups, with the north of the city more targeted in general. NRF claimed 19 attacks in four PDs seemingly not targeted by AFF, as seen in Figure 4 below. Furthermore, AFF claimed one attack in PD3, an area not targeted by NRF.

Remarks

As of November 2024, AFF and NRF remain the two main armed resistance groups operational in the country that regularly conduct attacks against Taliban targets. AW’s analysis of the groups’ reported activities between January and October 2024 reveals an increase in both the number of operations throughout the year and their expansion into new provinces. Both groups remain highly active in the capital, claiming a significant number of attacks across the majority of the city’s PDs. 

It is notable that AFF is much more diligent about providing evidence (mostly videos) of its attacks, while the more established NRF is perhaps relying on its “brand” alone for credibility. While the increase in the number and reach of claimed attacks observed during the first ten months of 2024 is a notable development, it is not an unexpected one. The groups have maintained steady operations during the past years despite being targeted by the Taliban, while the NRF's shift to guerrilla-style tactics have seemingly freed up resources for more sporadic attacks.